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ARTICLE 
 
Re-examining Acts of God 
JILL M. FRALEY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For more than three centuries, tort law has included the 
notion of an act of God as something caused naturally, beyond 
both man’s anticipation and control.1  Historically, the doctrine 
applied to extraordinary manifestations of the forces of nature, 
including floods,2 earthquakes,3 blizzards,4 and hurricanes.5  
 
* Jill M. Fraley is Tutor in Law and a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School.  
I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Robert Gordon, Bruce 
Ackerman and Robert Burt. 
 1. See, e.g., Forward v. Pittard, 99 ENG. REP. 953, 956-57 (1785). 
 2. Courts differ in their categorization of floods, which might or might not 
be acts of God, depending on the magnitude of the flood and whether or not such 
flooding is common in the area.  See United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. CV-
89-039-BU-PGH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22885, at *18 (D. Mont. July 1, 1996) 
(finding that floods as acts of God depends on circumstances of location and 
magnitude); Webb v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 18 N.W.2d 
563, 568 (Neb. 1945) (not all floods will be acts of God, depending on how 
extraordinary or unprecedented the flood is). 
 3. See Mega Const. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 396, 497-98 (1993) 
(earthquake could be an act of God, but court here did not find clear evidence of 
causation of the damages at issue); Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 445 
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (listing earthquakes among acts of God); Shannon v. Russell, 
203 B.R. 303, 314 (1996) (same). See also Holister v. Maynard, 29 C.C.P.A. 1249, 
1255 (1942) (contract describing earthquakes as acts of God); York v. Jones, 717 
F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (same). 
 4. See, e.g., McKinley v. Hines, 215 P. 301, 302 (Kan. 1923) (holding that 
while some blizzards are acts of God, the event in question was not sufficiently 
severe to be an act of God since similar scale events had occurred in the past). 
 5. See Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1240 (D. 
Ala. 2001) (describing a hurricane as a “classic case of an act of God,” but also 
hinting that this is only true of a hurricane that causes “unexpected and 
unforeseeable devastation” and that, therefore, some hurricanes might not be 
acts of God). See also Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 655 
(E.D. La. 2002) (finding that not all hurricanes are unanticipated and therefore 
would not qualify as an act of God even if meeting other criteria); Freter v. 
Embassy Moving & Storage Co. 145 A.2d 442, 444 (Md. Ct. App. 1958) (even 
1
FRALEY  
670 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
Despite the significance of the doctrine, particularly in large-scale 
disasters, scholars rarely engage the act of God defense critically.6  
However, recently, the doctrine has received more substantial 
criticism.  Denis Binder argued that the doctrine should be 
repudiated as merely a restatement of existing negligence 
principles.7  Joel Eagle criticized the doctrine, suggesting that it 
should not exclude liability for damages resulting from Hurricane 
Katrina, but his argument rested more on an issue of fact—
whether the hurricane was foreseeable—than a critique of the 
doctrine itself.8  With so little attention given to this ancient 
doctrine, scholars have yet to consider the implications of major 
theoretical shifts in both law and geography that repudiate a 
separation of “the human” from “the natural.”  Notably, this 
neglect has continued despite significant grappling with defining 
“nature” and “natural” in other legal contexts such as patents,9 
federal food and drug regulations,10 and public lands management 
or wilderness protection.11 
 
hurricanes are not always acts of God—nor is a single determination about an 
event necessarily valid across the miles thus a named hurricane may be an act 
of God in one place, but not twenty miles away); Laurencia Fasoyiro, Invoking 
the Act of God Defense, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1-2 (2009) 
(discussing the difficulty of predicting the behavior of hurricanes and their 
patterns). Strong winds may also in and of themselves be acts of God. See, e.g., 
Fairbrother v. Wiley’s, Inc., 331 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1958) (whether wind is act 
of God depends on foreseeability of winds of this scale); Jacobson v. Suderman & 
Young, Inc., 17 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1927) (same). 
 6. See C.G. Hall, An Unsearchable Providence: The Lawyer's Concept of Act 
of God, 13 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 227, 227 (1993) (noting the lack of analysis 
on the concept of acts of God); Denis Binder, Act of God? or Act of Man?: A 
Reappraisal of the Act of God Defense in Tort Law, 15 REV. LITIG. 1, 3-4 (1996) 
(noting lack of analysis of the concept of an act of God and citing limited recent 
publications). 
 7. See Binder, supra note 6, at 4, 77-79. 
 8. See Joel Eagle, Divine Intervention: Re-examining the "Act of God" 
Defense in a Post-Katrina World, 82 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 459 (2007).  
Laurencia Fasoyiro also recently commented on the act of God doctrine, but 
focused on its application in environmental statutes rather than the utility and 
clarity of the doctrine itself. Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
 9. See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 194-96 (2007) (discussing the problems of 
defining “natural” and the nature-culture or nature-human divide in patent law 
procedures which require establishing that a patentable project is not a “product 
of nature”). 
 10. See Daniel L. Kegan & Diane S. Lidman, United States Federal Food and 
Drug Administration May Consume Food Trademarks, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 199, 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/4
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 Currently, the acts of God doctrine continues its traditional 
uses in tort, contract, and insurance law, while also being 
enshrined in new environmental statutes as a method of creating 
a limit on liability when the polluter might not reasonably have 
anticipated circumstances—albeit a strict construction of the 
doctrine.12  For example, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act applies the acts of 
God doctrine,13 as does the Oil Pollution Act.14  Yet, it is precisely 
this context of environmental issues that places the most 
pressure on the theoretical validity of the defense.15  With 
increasing awareness of the human role in climatic and weather 
changes, dividing human from natural or divine action is far from 
uncomplicated. 
 This article discusses the origins, applications, and utility 
of the acts of God defense, particularly with an eye towards 
establishing its theoretical foundations and the reliance on the 
classical human-nature divide.  The article will demonstrate how 
the crumbling classical divide is already causing shifts in legal 
doctrines across areas as diverse as food and drug law, wilderness 
 
205 (1997) (discussing the FDA’s movements towards defining “natural”); A. 
Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies, 
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 
253, 261-71 (2007) (discussing the history of FDA labeling laws particularly as 
related to defining “natural”). 
 11. See Lee Godden, Preserving Natural Heritage: Nature as Other, 22 
MELB. U. L. REV. 719, 724 (1998) (exploring property and preservation laws in 
Australia that implement ideas of the nature-human divide); Gregory H. Aplet, 
On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What Wilderness Really Protects, 76 
DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 347-48, 366-67 (1999) (examining the Wilderness Act of 
1964 and the wilderness idea, which includes a separation of the human from 
the natural); Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation 
and an Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1015-17 (2004) 
(examining the Wilderness Act of 1964 and public lands management, including 
the separation of man from wild). 
 12. See Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2-3. 
 13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (2006). 
 14. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1) (2006). 
 15. The application of the act of God doctrine within environmental cases has 
previously been criticized. See Brian J. Stammer, "Nothing We Could Do": The 
Defense of Act of God in Environmental Prosecutions, 4 ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 93, 
93-95 (1993). 
3
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protection, and patents.16  Then through a deeper engagement 
with the geographical theory responsible for our renewed vision of 
the human-nature relationship, the argument establishes a 
critique of the act of God defense as it has been traditionally 
formulated.  In the final analysis, the article suggests that the act 
of God defense must be shifted to remove any reliance on a strict 
divide between human and natural action. 
II. THE ACTS OF GOD DOCTRINE 
The idea of an act of God dates at least to the sixteenth 
century opinion in Shelley’s Case, which found that the death of a 
party to the contract made performance impossible due to an “act 
of God.”17  The doctrine therefore emerges in a reference to 
general fairness—that a defendant might not be held responsible 
for the consequences of an event that he had no ability to prevent 
or predict, even with the best possible intentions.  As the court in 
Shelley’s Case explained, it was an event that “no industry can 
avoid, nor policy prevent.”18  In an attempt to give life to this 
notion of fairness, the courts in Shelley’s Case and other early 
decisions drew lines between those acts which were natural and 
those which were caused by man, so as to forgive man for those 
acts that were beyond his anticipation or control.  As such 
sympathetic cases of contract breach were brought to the 
attention of courts, the doctrine of acts of God developed.19 
Over the years, the doctrine solidified to include multiple 
elements.  In a recent Congressional definition, an act of God is 
“an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or 
 
 16. See Kegan & Lidman, supra note 10, at 205 (discussing the FDA’s 
movements towards defining “natural”); Endres, supra note 10, at 261-71 
(discussing the history of FDA labeling laws particularly as related to defining 
“natural”). 
 17. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (1581). The act of God doctrine 
continues to be available in the context of contracts—a context that will be 
largely omitted in this essay, which will focus exclusively on torts.  See, e.g., 
Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (Fla. 1944) 
(applying the act of God doctrine as a defense to a contract). 
 18. Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 220 (1581). 
 19. See ARTHUR A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1324 (1962). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/4
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avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.”20  This definition 
includes multiple elements: (1) “natural” causation; (2) a lack of 
foreseeability;21 (3) that “nature” must be the exclusive or sole 
cause; and (4) the effects must not have been preventable by 
reasonable due care or foresight of the defendant.22  While the 
concept of acts of God cannot be reduced to simply the idea of 
“forces of nature,” acts of God are understood to be a subset of 
these,23 thereby immediately raising the question of which acts 
are natural and which are human.24 
While many courts emphasize the defendant’s ability to 
anticipate the disastrous event,25 the very heart of the doctrine 
 
 20. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2006); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) 
(2006). 
 21. Additionally, where the defendant failed in another duty, such as a duty 
of inspection that might have made the damages foreseeable, the act of God 
doctrine will not apply. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Biliter, 413 S.W.2d 894, 
898 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Binder, supra note 6, at 16. 
 24. An act of God is often defined as an “event in nature,” then additional 
qualifications are added. See, e.g., Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888, 892 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (act of God is a natural event); Tel Oil Co. v. City of 
Schenectady, 718 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (App. Div. 2000) (an act of God must be 
from “exclusively natural causes”); Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 
241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Civ. Ct. 1963) (act of God is an event that “happens by 
the direct, immediate and exclusive operation of the forces of nature”).  One of 
the most significant additional qualifications is the element of scale, which 
moves an event from natural to act of God. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 55 P.2d 847, 849 (Cal. 1936) (“unusual volume” pushes natural event to 
an act of God); Trout Brook Co. v. Willow River Power Co., 267 N.W. 302, 305 
(Wis. 1936) (flood becomes act of God due to extraordinary level of rainfall). 
 25. See Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 9-10. A previous event of the same 
magnitude indicates that the defendant should have been prepared for a 
subsequent recurrence. See Fairbury Brick, Co. v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 
113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb. 1907) (earlier rainfall of similar proportions should 
have directed defendant to be prepared); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Pomeroy, 3 S.W. 722, 724 (Tex. 1887) (history of similar events made the event 
in question foreseeable and therefore not an act of God). Some cases suggest 
that the act of God defense does not apply unless the disastrous event is of the 
largest scale on record—thereby highlighting the significance of foreseeability in 
the analysis of the doctrine. See, e.g., McKinley v. Hines, 215 P. 301, 302-03 
(blizzard not an act of God since it was not the worst in the region recorded). But 
see Garfield v. City of Toronto, 220 O.A.R. 128 (Ont. Ct. App. 1895) (previous 
events of the same scale did not necessarily prevent the act of God doctrine from 
applying). Courts frequently apply the act of God doctrine where the event in 
question is described as “unprecedented.” See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water 
5
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rests upon the court’s strict interpretation of the human-nature 
separation.  Within the doctrine, an act of God occurs only when 
the event in question is caused exclusively by forces of nature 
without any human action or interference.26  The courts find that 
“[a]n act of God must be caused exclusively and directly by 
natural causes”27 because when “the cause . . . is found to be in 
part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from 
active intervention or neglect, the whole occurrence is thereby 
humanized and removed from . . . acts of God.”28  This emphasis 
carries over into the federal environmental statutes, which 
require that nature be the “sole cause” for an act of God.29  In 
discussing the doctrine, courts repeatedly expound on the 
doctrine’s limitation to those events that are “direct, immediate, 
and exclusive operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled or 
uninfluenced by the power of man and without human 
intervention.”30  As one court explained, “human activities cannot 
have contributed to the loss in any degree.”31  For an event to be a 
legal act of God, the natural event must have been the “sole and 
immediate cause of the injury,” with no “co-operation of man, or 
any admixture of human means.”32 
Where an act or omission of the defendant combined with an 
unprecedented natural force to cause the damages, the courts will 
not apply the act of God doctrine; the doctrine is limited to 
circumstances where there is no concurrent causation.33  Courts 
 
Co., 186 P. 766, 767 (Cal. 1920) (unprecedented flood); Enters. v. New York, 614 
N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (App. Div. 1994) (noting that “[f]undamentally, an act of God 
is an unusual, extraordinary and unprecedented event”). 
 26. Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 n.6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Fred Drew Constr. Co. v. Mire, 89 A.2d 634, 636 (D.C. 1952). 
 29. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(1)-(3); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(b)(1). 
 30. Butts v. City of S. Fulton, 565 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). 
 31. Cangialosi v. Hallen Constr. Corp., 723 N.Y.S.2d 387, 387 (App. Div. 
2001). 
 32. Michaels v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 30 N.Y. 564, 571 (1864). 
 33. See Schweiger v. Solbeck, 230 P.2d 195, 200 (Or. 1951) (where 
defendant’s accumulation of logging debris was a concurrent cause of the 
damages, the act of God doctrine did not apply); Okla. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 282 P. 
157, 163 (Okla. 1929) (“commingled” causation is not acceptable to prevent the 
defendant’s liability); Inland Power & Light Co. v. Grieger, 91 F.2d 811, 816-17 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/4
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have been strict in applying this requirement and place upon the 
defendant the burden of proving that the natural event was the 
sole cause of damages.34  Even if the defendant proves that an act 
of God occurred, he will still remain liable so long as the plaintiff 
is also able to prove that the defendant’s actions were an 
additional cause of the damage.35  In other words, the act of God 
must be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.36  The 
act of God must not only be a cause but also the “entire cause” for 
the doctrine to preclude liability.37 
Over the years, the doctrine was expanded to the context of 
insurance cases and, indeed, became a standard clause in many 
different types of insurance contracts.38  Insurers were willing to 
insure against human negligence, but if God was out to get you, 
they (perhaps quite reasonably) were not willing to take your 
side.39  Insurance contracts for commercial facilities would, for 
example, exclude liability for flood damage and lightning 
strikes.40  In contrast, policies that insured farms frequently cover 
acts of God but exclude damages resulting from human 
negligence.41  In both types of insurance policies, recourse is 
 
(9th Cir. 1937) (where causation is concurrent, the defendant is liable for the 
whole of the damages); Harris v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 91 S.E. 710, 711 (N.C. 
1917) (same). 
 34. Barnet v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 222 N.Y. 195, 198 (App. 
Div. 1918) (burden is on defendant to prove there is no concurrent negligence). 
 35. See, e.g., Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. v. Davis, 800 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ark. 
1990) (when an act of God combines with negligence, the defendant is still 
liable); Frederick v. Hale, 112 P. 70, 75-76 (Mont. 1910) (where an act of God 
and defendant’s actions were concurrent causes of the damages, plaintiff could 
recover). 
 36. Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Ark. 1977) (requiring sole 
proximate causation for the act of God doctrine to exclude liability). 
 37. Slater v. S.C. Ry. Co., 6 S.E. 936, 937 (S.C. 1888). 
 38. Chism v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-10483, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48575, at 
*2 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007) (citing an “act of God” provision as a “standard 
exclusion” within a modern insurance policy). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at *1-2 (plaintiff seeking to recover against insurer, where 
insurer claims Hurricane Katrina was an act of God; determination of liability of 
the insurer depends on whether the act of God exclusion applies). 
 40. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Jackson, CA07-182, 
2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 759, at *4 (Nov. 7, 2007) (citing insurance policy by Farm 
Bureau, which defined “wind, rain, lightning” as acts of God). 
 41. See, e.g., R & R Farm Enters. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., Dep’t of Agric., 788 
F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing policy covering acts of God but not human 
negligence). 
7
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frequently made to the courts to determine whether damages 
resulted from human action or an act of God.42 
III. THE CLASSICAL HUMAN-NATURE SEPARATION 
The nature-human separation has long been a part of 
Western culture.  Despite the prevalence of Darwinian models of 
evolution, which should complicate our ideas of nature as 
unchanging, nature has been seen as older than humans, existing 
both before and separate from them.43  Paralleling the central 
division of geography, between the human and the physical,44 
human action and causality have been studied separately from 
the physical with humans reacting to so-called natural events 
rather than participating in their creation.  In short, the natural 
has been defined so as exclude the human.45  Culturally, the 
division became so strong that nature was idealized as something 
“untainted” by humans.46  Thus, concepts such as “organic” and 
“natural foods” have been defined—both legally and culturally—
by excluding (and discounting the value of) human 
interventions.47 
In part, the nature-human separation was an inevitable 
product of our understanding of space itself—our tendency to 
view humans as the actors and the world as the background or 
stage, necessary but not pivotal for the storyline.  With space 
historically viewed as an “inert container,”48 scholars across fields 
tended to make physical geography merely a “backdrop to 
 
 42. The frequency of such provisions within insurance contracts is illustrated 
by the decision of Florida to enact a statute protecting policy owners from 
decisions to cancel their policies due to claims made because of acts of God. FLA. 
STAT. § 627.4133(3) (2009). 
 43. David Lowenthal, The Place of the Past in the American Landscape, in 
GEOGRAPHIES OF THE MIND: ESSAYS IN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 89, 102 (David 
Lowenthal & Martyn Bowden eds., 1976). 
 44. Franklin Ginn & David Demeritt, Nature: A Contested Concept, in KEY 
CONCEPTS IN GEOGRAPHY 300, 302 (Gill Valentine, et al. eds., 2009). 
 45. See id. at 5. 
 46. Lowenthal, supra note 43, at 102. 
 47. See Ginn & Demeritt, supra note 44, 300-01. 
 48. Margaret C. Rodman, Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality, 
in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SPACE AND PLACE: LOCATING CULTURE 204, 205 (Setha 
M. Low & Denise Lawrence-Zuniga eds., 2003). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/4
FRALEY  
2010] RE-EXAMINING ACTS OF GOD 677 
historical events.”49  Such understandings are now largely 
archaic, sinking behind a variety of new understandings of space 
as socially constructed and contested.  In his now classic work, 
Soja contested the old understandings, proclaiming that “space 
itself may be primordially given, but the organization, use, and 
meaning of space is a product of social translation, 
transformation and experience.”50  Massey elaborated, imploring 
us to not “deprive it of politics.”51  Crang meanwhile emphasized 
the human-space connection, not merely culturally, but 
ontologically, confirming that humans are “not bodies moving 
through space-time but making it.”52  Although these critiques of 
the earlier view of inert space are now widely accepted, the 
historical tendency to view space as a container for human action 
must be continuously recalled because the earlier view 
engendered and sustained the nature-human divide. 
Unsurprisingly then, as views of space changed, the nature-
human separation became suspect.  Philosophically, these 
observations are rooted in Foucault’s embrace of the spatial, 
which united theory of geography and philosophy53 and, more 
concretely, in hermeneutic phenomenology and Heidegger’s 
observations on vision, distance and dwelling.54  Drawing on these 
strands of philosophy, terms such as wilderness and nature 
represent a way of seeing the world, a particular and chosen view 
placing the human outside and away from the object of vision.55  
 
 49. Neil Smith & Anne Godlewska, Critical Histories of Geography, in 
GEOGRAPHY AND EMPIRE 1, 2 (Neil Smith & Anne Godlewska eds., 1994). 
 50. Edward W. Soja, The Socio-Spatial Dialectic, 70 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. 
GEOGR. 207, 210 (1980). 
 51. Doreen Massey, Politics and Space/Time, in PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF 
IDENTITY 141, 142 (Michael Keith & Steve Pile eds., 1993). 
 52. Mike Crang, Rhythms of the City: Temporalised Space and Motion, in 
TIMESPACE: GEOGRAPHIES OF TEMPORALITY 187, 194 (Nigel Thrift ed. 2001). 
 53. See Chris Philo, Foucault’s Geography, in THINKING SPACE 205, 205-06 
(Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift, eds. 2001). 
 54. For a discussion of Heidegger and the impact on geography, see Julian 
Thomas, The Politics of Vision and the Archaeologies of Landscape, in 
LANDSCAPE: POLITICS AND PERSPECTIVES 19, 22-25 (Barbara Bender ed. 1993). 
 55. This summary represents a general trend in our understandings of 
nature but does not reflect a belief that our notions of nature are unchanging.  
Indeed, as historians turn to examining environmental history, we are 
discovering the specifics of the variations. See, e.g., Ursula Lehmkuhl, 
Historicizing Nature: Time and Space in German and American Environmental 
9
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Distance and a sense of human superiority56 flow naturally from 
this separation, as does a sense that nature is passive, while 
humans are active.57  The result is that “[i]n our everyday 
language, we tend to treat nature and society as separate 
entities.  If something is social, then almost by definition it can’t 
be natural.”58 
As geographers recognized this process of social construction, 
their investigations turned to the impact of our visions of nature.  
While the model of social construction may be applied to many 
concepts, geographers have maintained that some, such as 
nature, are keywords—particularly powerful representations of 
the world that are likely to be manipulated.59  In other words, 
“[t]he language and ideas that are used to identify, describe and 
explain the natural world are influenced by the kinds of societies 
people live in, believe in and/or want to secure.”60  As Braun and 
Castree described in their influential study Remaking Reality: 
Nature at the Millennium, when we construct our particular—
and culturally located—visions of nature, those representations 
then generate consequences for our understandings of ourselves 
and our environment.61  Representations of landscapes relate to 
culture and identity, as well as larger themes such as the process 
of colonization.62  Particular landscapes became equated with 
 
History, in HISTORIANS AND NATURE 17, 17-18 (Ursula Lehmkuhl & Hermann 
Wellenreuther eds., 2007). 
 56. As Paul Cloke and Ron Johnston observed, “binary thinking . . . is rarely 
symmetrical: it usually involves ‘us’ considering we are superior to ‘them.’” Paul 
Cloke & Ron Johnston, Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, in SPACES 
OF GEOGRAPHICAL THOUGHT: DECONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY’S BINARIES 1, 
3 (Paul Cloke & Ron Johnston eds., 2005). 
 57. It is important to note that there is a scale to this distance, and, 
historically, women and indigenous people have been represented as “closer” to 
nature than the more “civilized” male. 
 58. STEVE HINCHLIFFE, GEOGRAPHIES OF NATURE: SOCIETIES, ENVIRONMENTS, 
ECOLOGIES 10 (2007). 
 59. See NOEL CASTREE, NATURE 111 (2005) (discussing and accepting Brian 
Harvey’s conclusion that nature is a keyword). 
 60. See Hinchliffe, supra note 58, at 27. 
 61. See B. BRAUN & N. CASTREE, REMAKING REALITY: NATURE AT THE 
MILLENNIUM 3-6 (1998). 
 62. On the process of colonization and imagery of nature and landscape, see 
STEPHEN DANIELS, FIELDS OF VISION: LANDSCAPE IMAGERY AND NATIONAL 
IDENTITY IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (1993); Christopher Tomlins, 
The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: 
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moral norms—forests with lawlessness,63 mountains with a lack 
of civilization64—justifying the imposition of outside rule.  As the 
examples of mountains and forests suggest, the process of moral 
mapping varied across environments.  Representation favored 
certain areas over others, resulting in a multidimensional moral 
geography.  Then, drawing on certain favored representations, 
national identities were rooted in symbolic homelands, which 
encoded the more desirable social norms and values.65  Therefore, 
by thinking of nature and land in particular ways, we are not 
only able to change the meaning of these terms but also to change 
ourselves. 
While these critiques of the simple nature-human dichotomy 
have been accepted as logically valid and philosophically 
coherent, theorists have yet to move beyond acknowledgement to 
face the deeper question: if “human” and “nature” are not 
separate, discrete categories, then how can we accurately 
understand the concepts—and specifically their overlap, 
connection, or integration?  By invoking the model of social 
construction, we risk perpetuating the division in some ways.  If 
what we mean by social construction is simply that our 
terminology is flexible and culturally specific and therefore not to 
accurate to “the world,” then we continue to imply the existence of 
a separate “nature,” continuing on as it is but without accurate 
description.  As Hinchliffe explained, “there is an assumption 
here that the knowledge of nature is being polluted, or watered 
down, by social and/or political matters.  And, the inference is 
 
English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century, 26 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 315-16 (2001); John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, 
and the Law: A Forward, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 309 (2001).  For an example 
of how these visions of nature differ depending on cultural context, see THOMAS 
M. LEKAN, IMAGINING THE NATION IN NATURE: LANDSCAPE PRESERVATION AND 
GERMAN IDENTITY 1885-1945 15 (2004) (giving an account of the German concept 
of landscape, as contrasted with the American). 
 63. See Stephen Daniels, The Political Iconography of Woodland in Later 
Georgian England, in THE ICONOGRAPHY OF LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON THE SYMBOLIC 
REPRESENTATION, DESIGN AND USE OF PAST ENVIRONMENTS 43, 44 (Denis 
Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988). 
 64. See JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST 
HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 20 (2009). 
 65. See DANIELS, supra note 62, at 5; WENDY JOY DARBY, LANDSCAPE AND 
IDENTITY: GEOGRAPHIES OF NATION AND CLASS IN ENGLAND 1-4 (2000). Darby 
explains her project as being rooted in the question of “how landscape functions 
as a repository of social, economic and political history.”  See id. at xv. 
11
FRALEY  
680 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
often that nature itself remains unmoved by all of this huff and 
puff.”66  To avoid this error, we must instead do more than simply 
acknowledge our representations of nature as social 
constructions.  The challenge is to take seriously the implications 
of geographical research into the relationship between human 
identity and nature, while also realizing that nature “cannot be 
easily located, described or used.”67 
Unfortunately, rather than face the complexity of the human-
nature relationship, we have retained our habits of speaking of 
human relationships with and to nature,68 of “human use of the 
earth,”69 contemplating the “‘scene’ upon which human culture 
develops,”70 and, drawing on Foucault, seeing the corporeal as 
“imprinted by history.”71  These concepts connote passive and 
receptive forms of nature as a space for human action.  Drawing 
on this traditional way of speaking even recent work in the field 
of geography describes events from “flood and forest fires to 
animal attacks and crop diseases” as “non-human interventions”72 
despite the fact that there is scientific evidence that ties the 
frequency and origins of all of these events to human actions.73  
Because we have not substantially developed a new 
understanding of “nature” and “human” as integrated, we easily 
fall back to the old dichotomy.  Other fields such as law, which 
 
 66. Hinchliffe, supra note 58, at 35. 
 67. See id. at 47. 
 68. Denis Cosgrove, Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the 
Landscape Idea, 10 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGR. 45, 55 (1985) (emphasis 
added). 
 69. DENIS COSGROVE, SOCIAL FORMATION AND SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE 2 (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 70. Kenneth R. Olwig, Recovering the Substantive Nature of Landscape, 86 
ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGR. 630, 644 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 71. Judith Butler, Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions, in THE 
JUDITH BUTLER READER 90, 104 (Sarah Salih ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 72. Michael Woods, Engaging the Global Countryside: Globalization, 
Hybridity and the Reconstitution of Rural Place, 31 PROGRESS IN HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY 485, 498 (2007). 
 73. For a discussion of the human role in generating climate change through 
greenhouse gas emissions, see Mike Hulme, Abrupt Climate Change: Can 
Society Cope?, 361 PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI. 
2001, 2002 (2003). For a discussion of human causation and climate change 
related events such as heat waves, heavy rainfall, storms and flooding, see John 
F.B. Mitchell, Extreme Events Due to Human-Induced Climate Change, 364 
PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI. 2117, 2117 (2006). 
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draw upon social science for their theoretical bearings, follow 
suit.74 
IV. THE HUMAN—NATURE SEPARATION IN LAW 
Law is itself a site of cultural production, developing concepts 
such as the ideal of nature through legal texts and decision-
making.75  In the U.S., law reinforced the idea of wilderness as 
excluding the human and, through the Wilderness Act of 1964, 
specifically set out both practice and policy in terms of this 
separation.76  The Act defines wilderness regions as being “in 
contrast with those areas where man and his own works 
dominate the landscape,” noting the “primeval character and 
influence” of wilderness.77  At the same time, the Wilderness Act 
defined the purpose of the wildness not in terms of any inherent 
value but in terms of its value as a “resource” for human use, 
enjoyment and consumption.78  The Act specifically allows for the 
harvesting of minerals and timber, along with surveying and 
prospecting activities,79 while forbidding development, permanent 
settlement, and road construction.  The law drew upon existing 
cultural ideas to frame the notion of wilderness and then, with its 
own tools, generated a series of social practices embodying that 
peculiar notion of the wild.  As the Wilderness Act demonstrates, 
law produces culture, but simultaneously, law is reproductive and 
referential, and incorporates widely accepted cultural notions and 
scientific conclusions. 
In the context of recent food and drug law developments, the 
separation of human and nature has distilled in the question of 
 
 74. Very few legal scholars show evidence of being aware of the philosophical 
conclusions from other fields on the human-nature dichotomy. For an Australian 
exception, see Godden, supra note 11, at 720, 724. While a few American articles 
discuss the problem of the human-nature separation (such as those already cited 
within this article), generally those discuss the problem without reference to the 
modern philosophical literature. See, e.g., Andrew Long, Defining the 'Nature' 
Protected by the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from Hatchery Salmon, 15 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 420, 457-59 (2007). 
 75. David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of 
(Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS ASSOC. AM. GEOGR. 487, 489 (2001). 
 76. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006). 
 77. Id. § 1131(c). 
 78. Id. § 1131(a). 
 79. Id. § 1133(d)(2)(3). 
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product labeling—the issue of what is “organic,” “natural” or 
“unprocessed.”80  All foods sold in our markets require some forms 
of human participation from picking and shipping, to roasting 
and freezing, to dyeing, waxing, and genetically altering.  
Separation of the human and the “natural” is increasingly being 
recognized in this context as more a scale than a division—hence 
the origins of popular language such as “minimally processed.”81  
Some examples are particularly confusing.  Roast turkey, for 
example, may be visibly enhanced using beet coloring extracts.  
The beet coloring extracts are a naturally occurring, not human 
engineered product, but in nature the beet coloring would not be 
found within the turkey.82  In such cases, application of the term 
“natural” becomes increasingly complicated.  Such 
circumstances—particularly in the context of strong American 
rules regarding food product identification and misleading 
statements—have encouraged manufacturers to demand federal 
government standards defining “natural.”83  As a result of the 
changing of regulations within the FDA, trademarks have also 
been affected.84 
In the context of public land use within the United States 
(U.S.), there is also a significant debate about what is natural and 
what is human.  Traditionally, the definition of “wilderness” in 
federal law has incorporated a sharp separation of human and 
natural activities; wilderness is a place “untrammeled by man.”85  
The issue continues to be raised as some public lands are 
designated as “wilderness” while others are not.  The point 
remains significant because there is a long tradition within 
American history of using public lands for numerous—often 
environmentally destructive—uses such as mining; such uses 
were not only tolerated but, actually encouraged by the federal 
government.86  Currently more than sixty percent of public lands 
 
 80. See Endres, supra note 10, at 261. 
 81. Id. at 263. 
 82. Example is drawn from id. at 263. 
 83. The Sara Lee Corporation petitioned the FDA, while Hormel foods 
petitioned the FSIS. See id. at 264, 270. 
 84. See generally Kegan & Lidman, supra note 10. 
 85. Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c); accord Aplet, supra note 11, at 352 
n.30. 
 86. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 114-17 (1957) 
(discussing the history of mineral uses of public lands). 
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are used in some type of development, including mining and 
lumbering.87  The wilderness distinction—one which rests upon 
the division of human and nature—is critical to preservation. 
The historic nature-human separation, as embedded in both 
science and Western culture more generally, has been 
significantly influential at a theoretical level in the development 
of legal doctrine.  Doctrines of property ownership affirm that 
nature becomes a possession through labor—thereby affirming 
nature and human as separate but for the very specific human 
intervention of labor.88  Similarly, legal doctrine largely treats 
land as a commodity, individual pieces being entirely 
interchangeable if commercial value is equal.89  Because human 
attachment to land is a mere emotionality, law need not recognize 
such attachments.  (The Wilderness Act itself includes one 
example of this rule of exchange of property for its “equal value” 
or a “similar parcel” of value).  This position is, of course, 
reflected in legal decisions on group land rights, religious access 
to land for Native Americans, eminent domain, and, most 
notably, in the colonization process where law enabled views of 
Native American land as empty.90  Although there are many legal 
doctrines incorporating the human-nature separation, the idea is 
crystallized perhaps most clearly in the doctrine of acts of God, 
which dates back three centuries in the law of the United 
Kingdom, U.S., and other commonwealth countries.91 
V. RE-EXAMINING ACTS OF GOD IN A POST-
CLIMATE CHANGE WORLD 
The act of God doctrine gives life to the nature-human 
separation, specifically in the context of causation.  For an event 
to be an act of God, it must be “a direct, immediate and exclusive 
operation of the forces of nature, uncontrolled and uninfluenced 
 
 87. See Zellmer, supra note 11, at 1023. 
 88. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 11 (1994). 
 89. Jill Fraley, Reparations, Social Reconciliation, and the Significance of 
Place: A Legal and Philosophical Examination of International and Indigenous 
Cases in American Courts and Their Global Implications, 31 HUMAN. AND SOC’Y 
108 (2007). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Binder, supra note 6, at 3. 
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by the power of man, and without human intervention.”92  The 
human and the natural have been treated here as wholly 
separate; thus evidence that “any factor other than the natural 
event . . . even slightly contributed to the [environmental 
damage] will destroy this element, and consequently, the entire 
defense.”93  The determining factor for an act of God is that it 
“proceeds from the forces of nature alone, to the entire exclusion 
of human agency.”94 
Courts have clung to this striking separation of the human 
and the natural, despite environmental historians challenging 
the issue of solely “natural” causation,95 and despite strong 
evidence that there is no separation (such as evidence that global 
warming increases the frequency of hurricanes).96  Although one 
of the very foundations of global climate change is the idea that 
“anthropogenic climate change. . . [can be] distinguished from the 
natural variability of the earth’s climate,”97 courts continue to act 
as though simple lines can be drawn between the human and the 
natural.  Indeed, a recent commentator described the act of God 
defense as meaning “something in opposition to the act of man” 
and applying only to those things that “could not happen by the 
intervention of man, [such] as storms, lightning and tempests.”98  
Further, the commentator stated that “an act of God . . . proceeds 
from natural forces alone, to the exclusion of human agency.”99  
The courts draw a solid line between “earthquakes, fires, storm, 
hurricanes, tornadoes,” which are acts of nature and “the 
inadequate design, construction, inspection, and maintenance [of 
structures, which are] acts of people,” and allocate causation of 
damages between the two actors differently.100 
 
 92. Fasoyiro, supra note 5, at 2. 
 93. See Eagle, supra note 8, at 483. 
 94. Rice v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 198 P. 161, 164 (Idaho 1921). 
 95. See Eagle, supra note 8, at 492. 
 96. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort 
Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563, 574 
(1998). 
 97. See id., at 565. 
 98. See Binder, supra note 6, at 7. 
 99. Id. at 18. 
 100. Id. at 19. 
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Indeed, the factual specifics of legal cases have given birth to 
years of interpretation about precisely where to draw that line.101  
With decades of decisions purporting to specifically determine the 
human-nature divide, it is hardly surprising the courts are 
challenged by recent developments in the social and 
environmental sciences questioning the ease of drawing a line 
between human and natural causation.  Since the mid-twentieth 
century, the question has been slowly rising to the forefront, 
beginning with cloud-seeding operations in the 1950s.  At that 
time, questions were beginning to form regarding human liability 
for events previously considered naturally caused.  By 1966, a 
report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce detailed the 
possibilities of legal liability for “weather and climate 
modification.”102  The National Academy of Sciences-Natural 
Resource Council and the National Science Foundation generated 
similar reports.103  By 1950, at least one state court decision had 
been issued in a case of alleged weather modification.104  A small 
body of a dozen or so cases followed by 1965,105 however the issue 
lapsed as cloud-seeding fell out of favor.  However, the issue did 
not lapse before one judge who suggested that, “perhaps the term 
‘act of God’ should be replaced by a concept which reflects the 
possibility of human causality as well as that of the divine.”106 
The issue of weather modification has reemerged in recent 
years, particularly in the context of flooding.  Flooding has 
 
 101. See, e.g., Rix v. Town of Alamogordo, 77 P.2d 765, 770 (N.M. 1938) 
(agreeing with trial court’s decision to apportion damages between human 
action and natural forces); Johnson & Johnson v. Dundas, 4 D.L.R. 624, 687 
(Ont. 1945) (apportioning damages and holding defendant liable for only the 
portion resulting from “normal” natural forces). To some degree these cases are 
the exception; most cases find that concurrent causation entirely precludes the 
act of God defense from applying. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Union Elec. Co., 216 
S.W.2d 756, 762-63 (Mo. 1948). Thus, most of the work of courts in drawing a 
line between human and natural action involves determining whether or not to 
apply the act of God doctrine. 
 102. Legislative-Reference-Service, Weather Modification and Control § 89th 
Congress (Sen. Rep. No. 1139 1966). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Slutsky v. City of N.Y., 97 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239-40 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
 105. Ralph W. Johnson, Legal Implications of Weather Modification, in 
WEATHER MODIFICATION AND THE LAW 76, 76-102 (Howard J. Taubenfeld ed., 
1968). 
 106. Joseph Resnick Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 241 N.Y.S.2d 134, 137 (Civ. 
Ct. 1963). 
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increased substantially in Appalachia in the wake of mountain 
top removal mining.  So-called “hundred year floods” are 
occurring annually in some regions and this flooding has been 
scientifically linked to the removal of the mountaintops (the 
spongy green layers of vegetation and topsoil, which absorb rain 
and prevent rain from simply rushing straight to the valleys.)107  
As one court recently noted, flooding may result from 
“topographical and climatic conditions of the region, . . . the 
nature of the drainage basins as to the perviousness of the soil, 
[and] the presence or absence of trees or herbage which would 
tend to increase or prevent the rapid running off of the water.”108  
Yet, courts have been unwilling to hold mining companies 
responsible for the vast amounts of destruction (suffered by local, 
impoverished, populations) due to this specific type of mining.  
Floods are, as the mining companies maintain, acts of God.  The 
nature/human divide obscures human intervention, even though 
we have known for decades that flooding is highly linked to “the 
presence or absence of trees or herbage which would tend to 
increase or prevent the rapid running off of the water.”109 
However, in the era of global climate change, courts can 
hardly pretend that causation can be determined to be “natural” 
or “human.”  Storm patterns and frequencies are changing.110  
Growing seasons are shifting.111  Glaciers are melting and seas 
 
 107. See RONALD D. ELLER, UNEVEN GROUND: APPALACHIA SINCE 1945 40 
(2008). 
 108. Frank v. County of Mercer, 186 N.W.2d 439, 443 (N.D. 1971). 
 109. See Binder, supra note 6, at 15; see also Butts v. City of S. Fulton, 565 
S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (human activities—construction work—
had changed the shape of the landscape in ways that prevented the previous 
natural pattern of run-off during a heavy storm). 
 110. See Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117 (generally discussing the human role 
in causing extreme climate events and referring specifically to heavy rainfall, 
storms and flooding); J.C.R. Hunt, Floods in a Changing Climate, 360 PHIL. 
TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL & ENGINEERING SCI. 1531, 1535 (2002) 
(discussing the potential for change in the occurrence of cyclones); Mark A. 
Saunders, Earth’s Future Climate, 357 PHIL. TRANS.: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL 
& ENGINEERING SCI. 3459, 3468-69 (1999) (discussing the current and 
anticipated changes in hurricane patterns). 
 111. See Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117 (human causation of heat waves); 
Hulme, supra note 73, at 2006 (discussing human causation of global warming 
and cooling in different areas and using the example of Greenland’s increasingly 
extended warmth); Virginia H. Dale, The Relationship Between Land-Use 
Change and Climate Change, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 753, 753-62 (1997) 
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rising.112  Hurricane frequency in the Atlantic has sharply 
increased.113  Events of large and small magnitude have origins in 
human action—and governmental inaction.  Global climate 
change will present courts with the kinds of difficult factual 
situations that make it impossible to pretend the old act of God 
divide should stand untouched.  Even though a particular 
defendant in a given case may not have been demonstrably at 
fault, the act of God doctrine remains analytically flawed because 
it requires that “nature” be the sole cause of a phenomenon to the 
exclusion of all human action.  In effect, the doctrine asks parties 
to the case to prove the impossible—to prove that nature can be 
absolutely separated from the human.  The act of God doctrine is 
analytically unsupportable—and yet it continues to be applied. 
 Yet this ontological reality is the logical conclusion of 
earlier critiques: to speak of landscape, as a mere repository for 
human action is to deny ontological truths.  If nature is not 
exclusive of humans, then nature in and of its being includes the 
human.  The human and the natural share corporality in the 
double sense of having nature in common as a characteristic and 
having it in common as a shared assets.  Drawing on Crang’s 
development of concepts of space as ontological, with humans 
creating space-time, human-nature may be understood as 
multiple points of space-time intersection—points where humans 
 
(discussing the reciprocal relationship between land use and climate change and 
explaining how agriculture causes climate change, while climate change also 
changes agricultural patterns); see also Martin Parry, Climate Change, Global 
Food Supply and Risk of Hunger, 360 PHIL. TRANS.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2125, 2137 
(2005) (suggesting that the food supply will change in the future due to changing 
temperatures and such issues as water availability and the heat tolerance of 
plants). 
 112. For a discussion of past documented sea level increases and anticipated 
future increases, see Saunders, supra note 110, at 3467-68, 3470-71. For a 
discussion of coastal flooding as a result of sea level rises and the anticipated 
population movements as a result, see Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: 
A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHIL. TRANS.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 
609, 702 (2002). Hunt, supra note 110, at 1535, agrees, noting the anticipated 
future sea increases. Hunt also discusses the glacier melt. See id. at 1535. For a 
case study in past and future glacier melt, see generally Myrna H.P. Hall & 
Daniel B. Fagre, Modeled Climate-Induced Glacier Change in Glacier National 
Park, 1850-2100, 53 BIOSCIENCE 131 (2003). 
 113. See Saunders, supra note 110, at 3468-69; Mitchell, supra note 73, at 
2117. Hurricanes and cyclones are anticipated to increase further in the future.  
See Saunders, supra note 110, at 3470-71; Hunt, supra note 110, at 1535; 
Mitchell, supra note 73, at 2117; Hulme, supra note 73, at 2006. 
19
FRALEY  
688 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
not only generate ideas of nature but are generative of the 
physical world and humankind.114  The human condition is not 
just to experience the world through a body but also to be 
physically created by our environment and to experience that 
environment through time. 
 By engaging the history of the categories of “natural” and 
“human,” we can analyze the process of “bounding or 
bordering.”115  We can reflect on what we have embraced or 
avoided through our categorizations.  Perhaps at the deepest 
level, the tightly policed borders of our historic categorizations of 
the human and the natural reflect our very existential crisis: a 
worry that life is fleeting, that bodies do indeed return to dust, 
that we are more like the other animals than we imagine.  
Hierachicalizations have been a constant in this analysis: nature 
is either idealized above the human (to be kept pure and 
unadulterated, free of chemicals and genetic engineering) or 
denigrated below it (to be mastered and rendered passive 
“resource” to be acquired and used).  Through these notions, our 
categories have lent political support to many debates.  And by 
being either above or below, humans have avoided the idea that 
we are a part of the natural. 
 Embracing a human-nature ontology complicates 
determinations of causality (while rendering them more accurate) 
but also frees us from the restrictive Western dichotomies that 
have supported environmental destruction (with the human 
having mastery over nature), as well as gender oppressions (with 
the female regarded as more linked to the body, closer to nature 
and thereby less intellectual).  Through this embrace we open 
ourselves to recognizing truths long held by other cultures.  For 
instance, Laguna Pueblo symbolic geography speaks of a 
“spiritual being who represents an aspect of nature, and may 
appear either in the human shape of an animal (like Spider 
Woman) or in the form of a person.”116  In this way, humans and 
nature are understood as coterminous—neither aspect being less 
than, more than, or apart from the other.  Shapes and perceptions 
 
 114. See Crang, supra note 52, at 194. 
 115. Reece Jones, Categories, Borders and Boundaries, 33 PROGRESS IN HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY 174, 175 (2009). 
 116. Edith Swan, Laguna Symbolic Geography and Silko's Ceremony, 12 AM. 
INDIAN. Q. 229 (1988). 
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are fluid, generating even intersections (as in the “human shape 
of an animal”) while the ontological remains the constant.  Only 
such a recognition of the shifting intersection—the mutual 
createdness, not just in idea and category, but in being itself—
will generate new perspectives in social policy. 
 With respect to the acts of God doctrine, this suggests that 
our current legal frameworks are deficient.  By continuing to 
embrace the doctrine, we resist bringing our legal concepts into 
line with modern scientific understandings—and implicitly 
perpetuate the public myth that our actions are without climatic 
consequences.  In light of other excellent work on the doctrine, 
which has argued that the act of God defense adds nothing 
substantial to our analysis of negligence,117 the doctrine might be 
eliminated in favor of a renewed emphasis on the causation 
analysis.  If, as Binder has suggested, the doctrine does not aid 
our decision-making process, then its usefulness is easily 
outweighed by the negative impacts of continued application, 
both in terms of public perceptions of the human-nature divide 
and in aligning law with our scientific understandings of the 
world. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article contends that it is critical to move beyond simply 
recognizing “nature” as a social construction excluding human 
content.  If “nature” is not what we have thought, we must seek 
now to determine what, indeed, it is.  If we continue to speak of 
nature as something separate from human, we are denying the 
logical conclusion that nature does not exclude the human: the 
human and the natural share basic beings.  The two cannot be 
meaningfully separated.  This article argues that this recognition 
is critical in the current legal landscape, which in drawing on 
years of culture and science, has defined legal doctrine within the 
framework of a nature-human separation.  In particular, 
doctrines of causality have sought to separate the human from 
the natural to determine liability in tort and contract.  But most 
significantly, we now continue to separate the human from the 
natural while failing to admit the fiction within the doctrine.  The 
 
 117. See Binder, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
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public is increasingly aware that large-scale climatic changes can 
have a human causal component.  For the courts to continue to 
see human and nature as strictly separate in climatic event 
causation is to press the public’s faith in the courts.  While courts 
do, at times, choose to employ legal fictions, this remains a 
controversial practice,118 and one that may do damage to the 
public’s perceptions of the rule of law.119  While legal fictions are 
generally understood to “enabl[e] the law to do [that] which 
previously could not be done,”120 there is a genuine question here 
of whether the court should, as a matter of public policy, continue 
to pretend that humans are not actors in climatic events, thereby 
perpetuating moral ignorance of environmental consequences of 
our modern lives. 
 
 
 
 
 118. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 1-3 (1990). 
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from being the determining factor, then giving articulated reasons for decisions 
without being confusing or misleading to the public is of primary importance. 
For a further discussion of the significance of reasoned articulation that makes 
sense to the public, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD L. 
REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972). 
 120. Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital 
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